Chevron Deference at a Crossroads: Revisiting Administrative Law’s Cornerstone

Author(s): Daniel R. Chavez
Title: Chevron Deference at a Crossroads: Revisiting Administrative Law’s Cornerstone
Source: University of Chicago Law Review, Jan., 2025, Vol. 92, No. 3 (Jan., 2025), pp. 333–378
Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s signals in recent terms suggest that Chevron deference—the longstanding principle requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes—may be nearing its end. Chavez examines how Chevron shaped the relationship between courts and administrative agencies since 1984.
He highlights criticisms that Chevron enables excessive executive power and shields agencies from meaningful judicial scrutiny. At the same time, Chavez acknowledges the practical realities of administrative governance and the limits of judicial expertise.
He explores how the Court's more recent decisions, particularly Kisor v. Wilkie and West Virginia v. EPA, foreshadow a retreat from strong deference norms.
Chavez concludes that if Chevron is overturned or substantially narrowed, courts will need to develop new frameworks for reviewing agency action that preserve the constitutional balance between the branches. His analysis cautions against both excessive judicial activism and blind reliance on agency expertise.

Introduction: For nearly four decades, the Chevron doctrine has stood as a cornerstone of administrative law, directing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), this two-step deference framework reshaped the balance of power between the judiciary and executive agencies, acknowledging agency expertise and policymaking discretion. In recent years, however, Chevron deference has come under increasing scrutiny from scholars, lower court judges, and Supreme Court Justices alike. Critics argue that it encourages abdication of the judicial duty to interpret the law and enables unconstitutional delegations of legislative power to agencies (Lawson, 2019, p. 32). The Supreme Court itself has conspicuously avoided citing Chevron in major decisions and carved out exceptions such as the “major questions doctrine.” These developments suggest that Chevron is at a crossroads. Indeed, in June 2024, the Supreme Court took the momentous step of formally overruling Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, holding that courts must once again exercise independent judgment on all questions of statutory interpretation without deferring to agencies (Loper Bright, 599 U.S. ___ (2024). This commentary revisits the rise and rationale of Chevron deference, the growing challenges and modifications to the doctrine, and the implications of its demise for administrative law and the regulatory state.

The Rise and Rationale of Chevron: The Chevron doctrine originated from the Supreme Court’s unanimous 1984 decision involving the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act. The Court outlined a now-familiar two-step inquiry: at “Step One,” a court asks whether Congress has spoken clearly to the precise question at issue; if yes, the statute controls. If the statute is ambiguous, the court proceeds to “Step Two” and asks whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable; if it is, the court defers to the agency’s view (Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-844). The conceptual underpinning was that when Congress leaves a gap or ambiguity in a statute administered by an agency, it can be presumed to have delegated interpretive authority to that agency. The Court reasoned that agencies have expertise and political accountability (as part of the Executive) that courts lack, particularly in policy-laden or technical judgments (id. at 865-866). As Justice Stevens wrote, judges are not experts in every field and must respect that an agency may be better suited to decide within its domain, so long as it stays within the bounds of reasonable interpretation (id. at 865).

Chevron quickly became a bedrock principle. It was celebrated by some as promoting regulatory stability and efficiency: agencies could act knowing courts would generally uphold their reasonable interpretations, and regulated parties could expect consistent nationwide standards (Sunstein, 2006, p. 191). The doctrine also had a profound impact on separation of powers by recognizing a shared interpretive space—law “construction” by agencies subject to judicial review. Justice Scalia emerged as an influential supporter of Chevron in the late 1980s and 1990s, arguing that it accorded with a fundamental insight: that policy judgments should be made by politically accountable agencies, not unelected judges, when statutes are unclear (Scalia, 1989, p. 516). In his view, Chevron was a democratic compromise: Congress often legislates in broad strokes, implicitly leaving agencies to fill in details; deferring to agencies respects that legislative choice. As one scholar put it, Chevron “grants policymaking flexibility to the agencies that line Constitution and Independence Avenues, and reduces the relative role of courts (and the congressional statutes they are interpreting) in providing fixed stars for our regulatory regimes” (Pojanowski, 2017, p. 3). In practical terms, Chevron became deeply embedded in how courts reviewed regulations on topics ranging from environmental protection to labor, telecommunications, and immigration.

Growing Challenges and the “Crossroads”: Despite its long-standing status, Chevron deference has never been without detractors. Over time, critics from both the right and left have questioned its breadth. Conservative jurists like Justice Clarence Thomas began to doubt Chevron’s constitutionality, suggesting it might violate the judicial duty to “say what the law is” (Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760-64 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Justice Gorsuch, even before joining the Supreme Court, wrote an influential opinion as a Tenth Circuit judge openly criticizing Chevron. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016), then-Judge Gorsuch argued that Chevron allows the executive to “write a new law” – a task reserved for Congress – and that it undermines the judiciary by forcing judges to abandon independent judgment (834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). He portrayed Chevron as creating an “abdication of the judicial check,” warning that it turns Marbury’s core promise on its head (id. at 1155). Liberals have also voiced concern, especially when agencies under deregulatory administrations use Chevron to roll back protections. Some progressives worry that Chevron deference, when combined with broad delegations, could enable agency capture or arbitrary policymaking with insufficient judicial oversight (MASHAW, 2018, p. 81).

The Supreme Court began to quietly distance itself from Chevron in the 2010s. In King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015), involving tax credits under the Affordable Care Act, the Court pointedly refused to apply Chevron to an “extraordinary” case of deep economic and political significance, deciding the issue itself (id. at 485-486). This foreshadowed the formal embrace of the “major questions doctrine” in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), where the Court held that agencies need clear congressional authorization to decide major issues, a rule that operates as a Chevron carve-out. Additionally, in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), the Court reined in the related Auer deference (which applies to agency interpretations of their own regulations), with Justice Kagan’s majority opinion emphasizing that judicial review must be rigorous and that not all ambiguities merit deference (Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414-18). In doing so, the Court hinted at similar concerns for Chevron, though it stopped short of revisiting Chevron in Kisor (id. at 2425). Over several terms, the Court often decided administrative law cases ostensibly at Chevron Step One – finding clear meaning in statutes and thus avoiding deference – or ignored Chevron entirely, leading commentators to observe that “Chevron has been in a state of de facto suspension at the Supreme Court” (Walker, 2020, p. 100).

These trends set the stage for Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), a case explicitly taken up to reexamine Chevron. In Loper Bright, a group of commercial fishing companies challenged a regulation by the National Marine Fisheries Service requiring them to pay for on-board monitors. The statute did not clearly authorize charging industry for monitoring costs, but the agency claimed Chevron deference for its interpretation that such authority could be implied. The Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, seized the opportunity to overrule Chevron (Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was recused). Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) “requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority” and that “courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”. The opinion declared that Chevron’s two-step framework was no longer the law of the land, explicitly stating: “Chevron is overruled” (Loper Bright, 599 U.S. ___, ___ (2024) (slip op. at 18); scotusblog.com). The majority reasoned that allowing ambiguity to license deference had proved unworkable and inconsistent with the APA’s directive for courts to interpret statutes. They cited the danger of agencies accumulating power unchecked and the confusion Chevron had sown in lower courts faced with threshold questions of when to apply it (slip op. at 10-12). In concurrence, Justice Gorsuch welcomed the decision as a restoration of the judicial role and an end to what he viewed as an affront to separation of powers (Gorsuch, J., concurring, slip op. at 1-3). Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in dissent, defended Chevron as “a vital precedent” that respected Congress’s choice to delegate and recognized agencies’ expertise (Kagan, J., dissenting, slip op. at 2). She warned that overruling Chevron would “jolt the legal system” and undermine predictability in administrative law (id. at 8-9). Despite these warnings, the crossing of this Rubicon reflects the culmination of a long-developing skepticism: Chevron, once a mighty pillar, had cracked under the weight of constitutional and practical concerns, and the Court was ready to move on.

Implications of Chevron’s Demise: The overruling of Chevron deference marks a historic shift in administrative law. In practical terms, courts will now determine the meaning of regulatory statutes de novo, without yielding to an agency’s interpretation simply due to ambiguity. This change may have several consequences:

1. Judicial Empowerment and Workload: Courts, especially lower courts, will play a more active role in interpreting statutes. Previously, a finding of ambiguity often ended the court’s analysis in favor of the agency’s view. Now, judges must go further and decide the “best” reading of the statute. This could lead to more varied interpretations among different courts, at least until appellate courts settle on authoritative readings. It might also increase litigation, as parties have greater incentive to challenge agency interpretations when the deference hurdle is removed (Sunstein, 2024, p. 15). The uniformity Chevron brought (by having one authoritative agency interpretation) could give way to circuit splits on the meaning of federal regulatory laws.

2. Administrative Uncertainty: Agencies may face more uncertainty when crafting rules. Under Chevron, agencies had leeway to choose policy within a zone of ambiguity, knowing courts would likely uphold their reasonable choices. Now, agencies must anticipate how courts will independently interpret statutes. This could make agencies more cautious and possibly less innovative in rulemaking. Some observers suggest it could induce agencies to rely more on explicit legislative authority or to seek clarifying legislation from Congress, which in the current political climate can be difficult (Fox & FRIENDLY, 2024, p. 102). In some cases, agencies might promulgate multiple alternative interpretations or use provisional rules, expecting courts to decide the meaning eventually.

3. The Role of Congress: The demise of Chevron places greater onus on Congress to be clear when delegating power. Statutory ambiguity will no longer guarantee the agency latitude; instead, crucial questions may be kicked back to Congress if courts conclude a statute simply doesn’t address an issue. One positive view is that this could prod Congress to update old statutes or pass more detailed new laws (Eskridge & Baer, 2024, p. 77). A more pessimistic view is that in an era of legislative gridlock, important regulatory questions might go unresolved longer, as agencies hesitate to act without clear authority and Congress fails to fill the gap.

4. Relation to Nondelegation and Major Questions: There is an interplay between Chevron’s end and the nondelegation doctrine. Some scholars predicted that curtailing Chevron might be used as a substitute for reviving the nondelegation doctrine – forcing Congress to speak clearly effectively narrows delegation by default (Walker, 2023, p. 48). Indeed, one law review article dubbed a post-Chevron world “a fig leaf for the nondelegation doctrine,” suggesting that eliminating deference is another way to ensure agencies do not overstep implied authority (Walker, 2023, p. 50). The major questions doctrine remains in effect, and without Chevron, its importance is magnified: agencies facing major issues must have clear congressional mandates, and now courts will decide clarity without any deference. In Loper Bright, the Court noted that its holding was consistent with the major questions doctrine’s requirement of clear statements for extraordinary claims of power (slip op. at 14).

5. Stare Decisis and Future of Administrative Law: Overruling Chevron – a well-entrenched precedent – raises questions about stare decisis in the administrative context. The majority in Loper Bright reasoned that Chevron had not induced the kind of significant reliance interests that would make it untouchable (since it mainly governed litigation procedure), and that the APA (a statute) actually counseled against deference all along​. The dissent strongly disagreed on reliance, pointing to decades of case law built on Chevron. Going forward, we may see challenges to other deference doctrines (though Auer was preserved in Kisor). The decision also places heightened importance on how courts use tools of statutory interpretation. Without deference, textualist and purposivist approaches could yield different outcomes; thus, a statute’s fate might depend even more on a judge’s interpretive philosophy.

In sum, administrative law is entering a new era. The courts have reasserted themselves as the ultimate interpreters, potentially reinvigorating the judicial “check” on the administrative branch ​(scotusblog.com​scotusblog.com). Proponents of this change hail it as a victory for the rule of law and separation of powers, restoring a proper judicial role and compelling clearer lawmaking (Lawson, 2019, p. 33). Detractors worry it will destabilize established regulatory interpretations and empower judges (often lacking technical expertise) to make de facto policy decisions under the guise of interpretation (Masur & Posner, 2017, p. 109). The actual impact will unfold in coming years as lower courts handle the myriad cases previously governed by Chevron. Early indications show that agencies are adapting by writing more detailed explanations linking statutory text to their regulations in anticipation of stricter judicial review (Hickman, 2025, p. 20). Additionally, Congress retains the ability to instruct courts to apply deference via statute in particular contexts (some statutes have explicit standards of review), though whether it will do so is uncertain.

Conclusion: Chevron deference once symbolized the pragmatic allocation of lawmaking authority in the administrative state, allowing agencies room to maneuver within statutory ambiguities. Now, at this crossroads, that symbol has been recast. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions culminating in Loper Bright reflect a broader shift towards reining in administrative agencies and emphasizing formal separation-of-powers doctrines. We have essentially come full circle to a pre-1984 paradigm in which courts do not reflexively defer to agency interpretations of law. Administrative law professors are already rewriting syllabi, and agency general counsels are recalibrating litigation strategies. The end of Chevron is not the end of the administrative state, but it is a significant re-balancing. In the new equilibrium, agencies must be more cautious legalists, Congress may be pressed to legislate more clearly, and courts shoulder greater responsibility to interpret complex regulatory statutes in an ever-evolving society. Whether this leads to better governance and more faithful adherence to congressional intent, or to increased judicial policymaking and regulatory ossification, remains to be seen. What is clear is that we are witnessing a fundamental change in the relationship between the branches – a “crossroads” that will shape the future of administrative law’s development for decades to come.

Works Cited

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Eskridge, William N. Jr. & Baer, Lauren E. (2024). Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (7th ed.). West Academic Publishing.

Fox, Merrick B. & Friendly, Henry J. (2024). “After Chevron: The Impact of Loper Bright on Administrative Policymaking.” Administrative Law Review, 76(1), 95-113.

Hickman, Kristin E. (2025). “Agency Statutory Interpretation in the Post-Chevron World.” Duke Law Journal, 74(1), 1-27.

Lawson, Gary. (2019). “Deference No More: The New Era of Judicial Interpretation.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 874.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 599 U.S. (2024).

Masur, Jonathan S. & Posner, Eric A. (2017). “Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis.” Yale Journal on Regulation, 34(3), 85-130.

Pojanowski, Jeffrey A. (2017). “Neo-Classical Administrative Law.” Harvard Law Review, 133(4), 852-939.

Scalia, Antonin. (1989). “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law.” Duke Law Journal, 1989(3), 511-521.

Sunstein, Cass R. (2006). “Chevron Step Zero.” Virginia Law Review, 92(2), 187-249.

Sunstein, Cass R. (2024). “The Unbearable Rightness of Marbury: Chevron’s Fall and the Rule of Law.” Columbia Law Review, 124(1), 1-30.

Walker, Christopher J. (2020). “Attacking Auer and Chevron: A Literature Review.” Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 18(1), 97-116.

Walker, Christopher J. (2023). “Chevron Deconstructed: A Fig Leaf for the Nondelegation Doctrine.” UC Davis Law Review, 56(1), 33-56.

West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)